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Donya G. Dobakhshari, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu, and Vijay Gupta
Abstract—We study a setup in which a system operator hires
a sensor to exert costly effort to collect accurate measurements
of a value of interest over time. At each time, the sensor is asked
to report his observation to the operator, and is compensated
based on the accuracy of this observation. Since both the
effort and observation are private information for the sensor,
a naive payment scheme which compensates the sensor based
only on his self-reported values will lead to both shirking and
falsification of outcomes by the sensor. We consider the problem
of designing an appropriate compensation scheme to incentivize
the sensor to at once exert costly effort and truthfully reveal
the resulting observation.
To this end, we formulate the problem as a repeated game
and propose a compensation scheme that employs stochastic
verification by the operator coupled with a system of assigning
reputation to the sensor. In particular, our proposed payment
scheme compensates the sensor based on both the effort in the
current period as well as the history of past behavior. We show
that by using past behavior in determining present payments,
the operator can both incentivize higher effort as well as more
frequent truthtelling by the sensor and decrease the required
verification frequency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Providing incentives for individuals to follow the system
operator’s desired policies in smart networks has received
increased attention in recent years (see, e.g., [1]–[4] and
the references therein). In a typical such setting, the system
operator delegates tasks to several autonomous agents. The
agents may not benefit directly from the outcome of the task,
and hence may not exert sufficient effort to complete the
task with the quality desired by the operator. Further, due to
reasons such as privacy, it may be costly (or even impossible)
for the system operator to access information such as effort
exerted by each agent or the resulting outcome directly;
instead, she must rely on the data reported by the agent.
Consequently, in the absence of a suitable compensation
scheme, rational self-interested agents may refrain from
exerting desired effort, and further possibly send falsified
information in response to the operator’s inquiry about the
task.
As our running example, we consider a crowdsensing
application in which autonomous sensors are employed to
take measurements about a quantity of interest to the system
operator over a predetermined time horizon. At each time
D. G. Dobakhshari and V. Gupta are with the Department of Electrical
Engineering, University of Notre Dame, IN, USA. Email:(dghavide,
vgupta2)@nd.edu. They are supported in part by NSF grants
1239224, 1544724, and 1550016.
P. Naghizadeh and M. liu are with the Department of Electrical En-
gineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, MI, USA.
Email:(naghizad, mingyan)@umich.edu. They are supported
in part by NSF grants ECCS-1446521 and CNS-1646019.
step, these measurements are used by the system operator to
generate an estimate of the quantity of interest. The sensors
incur an effort cost for obtaining each measurement with a
specified level of accuracy. A sensor can choose to increase
his effort and attain more accurate measurements, but at
the expense of a higher effort cost. This cost may model,
e.g., the cost of operating the device, or battery power. The
sensors are then rewarded based on the accuracy of the
information they provide to the operator. Since sensors do
not, in general, attach a value to the accuracy of the estimate
at the system operator, they do not have any incentive to
exert costly effort for generating accurate observations. Fur-
thermore, the system operator has no access to the sensors’
private information (i.e., either the level of effort, or the true
accuracy of the measurements they generate). As a result,
with a compensation scheme that rewards sensors for self-
reported accuracy of the measurements they generate, the
sensors may expend little effort, yet misreport their accuracy
in order to receive higher compensation. The problem we
consider in this paper is to generate a contract for the sensors
so that they provide measurements with sufficient accuracy to
enable the operator over time to generate an estimate with a
desired quality. While we concentrate on crowdsensing as the
example of interest in this paper, the contract can obviously
be applied to other examples mentioned earlier that face the
same challenges.
Intuitively, designing an appropriate contract in our setting
is difficult due to two reasons: (i) profit misalignment, and
(ii) information asymmetry between the system operator and
the sensor providing the information. To alleviate these chal-
lenges, the operator needs to design incentive mechanisms
that mitigate both moral hazard (i.e., incentivizing desired
actions when effort is costly and the level of effort expended
is private information for a participant, e.g., [5, Chapter 4])
and adverse selection (i.e., incentivizing participants to pro-
vide truthful information when information is private to
them, e.g., [5, Chapter 3]). While an extensive literature in
contract theory (see, e.g., [1], [5], [6] and the references
therein for an overview of the subject) has focused on
resolving either moral hazard or adverse selection separately,
we consider the problem of moral hazard followed by adverse
selection in a repeated setting. This problem has received
much less attention in the literature. Notable exceptions
include [7]–[9], and [10], which discuss the problem of moral
hazard followed by the adverse selection in a static frame-
work. The main difference of our work is to consider this
problem in a repeated setting. The repeated setting provides
new challenges to the problem in that sensors may adopt
time-varying strategies to gain, and then misuse, the trust of
the system operator. Further, the solutions in [7]–[10] rely on
verification of the outcomes generated by the agents (either
direct verification or cross-verification). If such verification
is costly, care must be taken in the repeated setting to bound
the verification cost by allowing only infrequent verification.
We would like to explain the concept of verification
here. In order to mitigate the information asymmetries of
moral hazard followed by adverse selection, the operator
must find some way to verify the sensor’s self-reported
outcomes. Verification is crucial, as the operator relies only
on the information transmitted by the sensor (i.e., she has
no additional measurements or observations of the value of
interest) and compensates the sensor for these measurements
over each time step. Therefore, verification of the sensor’s
self-reported values is crucial in settings with information
asymmetry (see e.g., [11]–[13], in which verification is
similarly proposed). However, the problem is not trivial even
with verification, since verification may be delayed, costly, or
imperfect. In this paper, we assume that verification is costly.
Thus, while the operator can verify the sensor at each stage
and through appropriate penalties ensure truthful revelation
by the sensors, this approach may not, in general, be optimal
for the operator in the sense of optimizing his total utility due
to costly nature of verification. Intelligent use of verification
is, in itself, not a trivial matter.
We propose an alternative scheme, in which we relax the
requirement for verification at every time step. We instead
assume that verification is done with a specified probability
at every time step. We use this verification scheme coupled
with a history-dependent payment scheme to then design an
optimal contract. In particular, we base the compensation on
a reputation score assigned to each sensor. This reputation
is based on the history of the past interactions of the sensor
with the operator. In other words, the operator rewards the
sensor based on the sequence of his actions, rather than
merely his behavior at the current stage. In particular, the
operator assigns higher reputation (and consequently higher
payments) to a sensor that is verified and detected to be
honest. The operator uses reputation as well as verification
to incentivize the sensor to exert sufficient effort, and also to
not misreport his outcome, so as to optimize his own utility
over multiple time steps.
It is worth mentioning that using reputation for mitigating
information asymmetry, particularly in repeated games, is a
popular strategy in the literature, see e.g. [14]–[18]. In [14],
the authors address the problem of mitigating pure adverse
selection by means of reputation indices in a static setting.
The authors of [15] present a comprehensive study of the
use of reputation for mitigating adverse selection in repeated
games, i.e., learning the hidden types of players through
repeated interactions. The works in [16]–[19] have focused
on repeated interactions between a system operator and an
agent under the assumption of only hidden action (moral
hazard) for the agent. The work in [16] proposes a method for
mitigating moral hazard using imperfect verification, while
[17] additionally introduces reputations.
In the crowdsensing literature, the work studied in [20]–
[23] are also related to the work presented in this paper.
[20] considers an ex ante payment for the agents with
verifiable outcome and mitigates the pure moral hazard
problem by introducing reputation-based incentive. Further,
a class of peer prediction methods has been studied in
[21]–[23]. Peer prediction mechanisms mostly consider the
perfect knowledge of actions by the agents and deal with
the problem of pure adverse selection. In addition, peer
prediction literature studies the existence of truthful Nash
equilibrium in a static framework. Note that the truthful
Nash equilibrium is not necessarily the maximum-benefit
equilibrium in these existing peer-prediction mechanisms,
i.e., the agents can gain more benefit by deviating from the
truthful equilibrium.
Note that the aforementioned literature assumes either
pure moral hazard or pure adverse selection or considers the
problem of mixed moral hazard and adverse selection in a
static setting. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first to study the use of reputation for mitigating both types of
information asymmetry simultaneously, in particular, moral
hazard followed by adverse selection.
The main contribution of our work is to adopt a repeated
game approach to the problem of simultaneously incentiviz-
ing high effort and truthful reports in a crowdsensing setup,
and more generally, in problems which exhibit moral hazard
followed by adverse selection. We propose a reputation-
based payment scheme coupled with stochastic verification
for compensating a sensor who realizes outcomes desired by
an operator. We show that under this scheme, the sensor will
exert higher effort over time, and will truthfully disclose his
accuracy with a higher frequency. Furthermore, the operator
needs to resort to verification with a lower frequency. Nev-
ertheless, the operator has to provide higher payments, as a
result of which her overall payoff may decrease. We discuss
the intuition, as well as some practical implications of these
observations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the model and some preliminaries.
We analyze the proposed reputation-based payment scheme
in Section III, and conclude in Section IV with some avenues
for future work.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We study the repeated interactions of a principal (here, the
system operator who is interested in estimating a quantity of
interest) who contracts with an agent (here, the sensor that
generates the measurements)1
Remark 1: We would like to point out that the restriction
to a single sensor is without loss of generality. This is due to
the fact that we assume no budget constraint for the operator
and do not consider cross verification among sensors. For
notational ease, we will concentrate on the case of a single
sensor being present.
1We will henceforth use she/her for the operator, and he/his for the sensor.
For our crowdsensing setup, the operator must contract with
the sensor since she does not have alternate sources of
measurements available. The accuracy of the measurements
taken by the sensor increases with the effort expended. Thus,
the operator is interested in incentivizing high effort by
the sensor, so as to attain sufficiently accurate estimates.
However, both the true effort exerted by the sensor, as well
as the outcome he obtains in terms of the measurement
or its accurracy, are unobservable by the operator. In other
words, the operator faces moral hazard (in that she does not
know the level of effort expended by the sensor) followed by
adverse selection (in that she does not know the outcome of
the effort). She therefore relies on the report by the sensor
on the accuracy of the estimation.
Formally, at every stage k (1≤ k≤N), the sensor performs
the following actions:
(i) He exerts an effort xk ∈ [0, x¯] to perform the task of
generating a measurement for which he incurs a cost
of h(xk). The effort xk leads to an outcome accuracy
level α(xk).
(ii) He informs the operator of the outcome accuracy
level. The sensor may misreport the accuracy level to
correspond to some other level of effort xˆk.
Assumption 1: The accuracy α(xk) is a deterministic
function of xk, and the function is known to both the sensor
and the operator. In other words, without loss of generality,
we may assume that the sensor reports simply his effort level
to the operator.
If the report of the sensor xˆk is equal to the actual effort
xk expended by her, we say that the sensor has been truthful
(T ) at stage k; otherwise, we say that the sensor has falsified
the output and is non-truthful (NT ). We assume at stage k
the sensor chooses T with probability qk.
The operator derives a benefit S(xk) from the task per-
formed by the sensor, which depends on the (true) effort xk
by the sensor. We assume that this function is increasing and
concave. We normalize S(0) = 0, i.e., the operator does not
derive any benefit when xk = 0.
The sensor does not necessarily attach value to the out-
come of the task assigned to him. As a result, he should be
properly incentivized to exert the effort level desired by the
operator. We assume that the operator offers a payment of
Pk to the sensor. The problem considered in this paper is the
design of this payment by the operator so that a rational self-
interested sensor will take actions that lead to maximization
of the operator’s utility.
We now specify the utilities of the operator and the sensor.
To this end, we need to discuss two factors that we will use
in our payment strategy: (i) verification of the sensor’s report
by the operator, and (ii) the history of the past reports/efforts
of the sensor, which are captured by a reputation score
assigned to the sensor. More specifically, at each stage k,
we assume that the operator takes an action vk ∈ {V,NV},
denoting verifying and not verifying, respectively, of the
sensor’s reported effort xˆk. We assume at stage k the operator
chooses V with probability pk. Further, we assume that the
verification is perfect and so that the operator accurately
detects any falsification by the sensor, and the operator incurs
a cost of C> 0 for this verification. Note that the verification
is conducted on the reported effort by the sensor (e.g., by
verifying the number of measurements generated by the
sensor), but not on the value of the measurements.
Let zk denote the level of effort known to the operator at
the end of stage k. Therefore,
zk =
{
xk if vk =V
xˆk if vk = NV .
(1)
In addition, the operator assigns a reputation Rk to the
sensor at each stage k. The reputation Rk is updated based
on the history of the sensor’s past reputation scores, as well
as the assumed effort zk at stage k, i.e.,
Rk = f (k,R1, · · · ,Rk−1,zk), k= 1, · · · ,N, (2)
where R0 = 0 and the function f (·) is the reputation function
selected by the operator. The operator then uses this repu-
tation score to offer a compensation of Pk := P(Rk) to the
sensor, where P(·) is an increasing function of Rk and is the
payment function that needs to be designed.
Given the above setup and compensation scheme, the
utility of the sensor at stage k is given by
USk = P(Rk)− h(xk).
For simplicity, in this paper, we assume a linear cost of effort
h(xk) = bxk, with a unit cost b> 0. b is assumed to be known
to the operator a priori. Therefore, the utility of the sensor
at stage k reduces to
USk = P(Rk)− bxk. (3)
The utility of the operator is given by
UPk = S(xk)−P(Rk)−CI {vk =V}, (4)
where
I {vk =V}=
{
1 if vk =V
0 otherwise
.
Both the sensor and the operator discount future payoffs with
a factor δ , so that their payoffs over the entire time horizon
is given by
US =
N
∑
k=1
δ kUSk , U
P =
N
∑
k=1
δ kUPk .
The operator has to optimize her choice of actions
{v1, · · · ,vN}, the reputation scores {R1, · · · ,RN} and the pay-
ments {P1, · · · ,PN} to maximize her expected utility E[U
P]
with satisfying the following constraints:
(i) Incentive compatibility (IC) constraint: A contract is
incentive compatible if the sensor chooses to take the
action preferred by the operator. Note that the sensor
is a rational decision maker, and therefore chooses
his effort level to maximize his expected profit E[US].
Formally, if x∗ = {x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
N} denotes the sequence of
efforts desired by the operator, then the compensation
scheme should be such that E[US(x∗)]≥ E[US(x)], ∀x.
(ii) Individual rationality (IR) constraint (Participation
Constraint): Both the operator and the sensor should
prefer participation in the proposed scheme to opting
out. Formally :
E[UP]≥ 0, E[US]≥ 0,
where E[·] denotes expectation. In particular, in E[US],
the expectation is with respect to the verification by
the operator, while in E[UP], the expectation is with
respect to the truthfulness of the sensor. Note that
both verification by the operator and truthfulness of the
sensor are stochastic.
Therefore, the optimization the problem for the operator
is given by
P1:


max
{v1,··· ,vN},{R1,··· , RN},{P1,··· , PN}
E[U p]
s.t. IC and IR constraints.
Remark 2: Note that the use of verification is indispens-
able: if the sensor is not verified, he will always exert effort
xk = 0, and falsify his effort as xˆk = x¯. The goal of introducing
a reputation-based payment scheme is, therefore, to reduce
(but not eliminate) the verification frequency.
Remark 3: While the problem we pose and the solution
we introduce can be considered for a general N, in this
paper we focus on N = 2. This case is sufficient to illustrate
the intuition behind the general solution, and is notationally
more concise. Considering the case of N > 2 and more
interestingly the case of infinite number of stages remain
for future work.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We now proceed to consider the two-stage (i.e., N = 2)
game between the sensor and the operator and solve the
problem P1 in this context. Specifically, we will present
a linearly weighted reputation-based payment scheme. We
analyze the effects of modifying the weight in this reputation
function on the effort expended by the sensor, the optimal
verification frequency, and the resulting utility of the opera-
tor.
A. The weighted reputation function
As discussed in Section II, the operator assigns a reputa-
tion Rk(·) to the sensor at each stage k= 1,2, and uses it to
assess the payment P(Rk).
Assumption 2: For simplicity and without loss of gener-
ality, we choose the payment function as P(Rk) = Rk, where
Rk is defined in (2).
We next propose a weighted reputation function, in order
to assess we define the history-dependent payments for the
sensor. Formally,{
Payment at the first stage= R(z1),
Payment at the second stage= (1−ω)R(z1)+ωR(z2),
(5)
where R(·) is an increasing and convex function, z1 and z2 are
defined based on (1), and 0≤ω ≤ 1 is the reputation weight.
Note that by adjusting the value of ω the operator decides on
the importance of the history of the behavior of the sensor
in assessing the current payment. For instance, when ω = 1,
the compensation is based solely on the (reported or verified)
effort expended at the current stage. We refer to this special
case of compensation scheme as instant payments.
We choose the following reputation scheme. If the sensor
is not verified, R(·) is evaluated based on the sensor’s
reported output xˆk in that stage. If the sensor is verified and
found to be truthful, he is assigned a reputation based on his
verified output xk, and is further added a reputation boost of
γ ≥ 0. If the sensor is verified and found to be non-truthful,
he gets assigned the minimum reputation denoted by l. We
set l = 0.2 We further make the following assumption.
Assumption 3: The operator chooses the reputation func-
tion from the linear family R(z) = αz+β .
Given this Assumption 3 and the fact that R(.) should be an
increasing function with the minimum value R(0) = 0 and
maximum R(x¯) = h, we conclude that the reputation function
is of the form R(z) = h z
x¯
, where R(x¯) = h≥ 0. Therefore, the
parameters h and γ are design parameters for the operator.
B. The payoff matrix
To find the payoffs of the sensor and the operator, note
that we have assumed no falsification cost for the sensor.
We have also assumed that the reduction in reputation due
to any detected falsification is independent of the amount
of falsification. As a result, if the sensor wishes to behave
strategically at stage k, he does not exert any effort and
realizes xk = 0, but reports the maximum effort xˆk = x¯, to
gain the maximum reputation/payment if not verified. The
payoff matrix of the stage game is thus specified in Table I.
For the game in Table I, the operator designs the parame-
ters of the compensation scheme (i.e., h, γ , and ω), to satisfy
IC and IR constraints, and maximize her profit. Therefore,
the optimization problem P1 is refined to :
P2:


max
ω,h,γ≥0
E[U p]
s.t. the (IC) and (IR) constraints,
Assumption 2, 3 and equation (5).
We now proceed to the analysis of the two-stage game for
which each stage is specified in Table I.
C. Nash equilibria
We start with the pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) of
the two-stage game with stage payoffs given in Table I.
Proposition 1: The only pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the game in Table I is (NT,NV ). In this equilibrium, the
operator offers no payment to the sensor, and the sensor
exerts no effort. This is equivalent to the outside option for
the operator.
Proof: We start with the potential pure Nash equi-
librium (T,V ), and analyze the payoff of the operator. By
playing V over NV at the first stage, the operator decreases
2A choice of l 6= 0 may be of interest to ensure individual rationality
when verification is not perfect.
V NV
T Rk(xk)+ γ −bxk , S(xk)−Rk(xk)− γ−C Rk(xk)−bxk, S(xk)−Rk(xk)
NT Rk(0), −Rk(0)−C Rk(x¯), −Rk(x¯)
TABLE I
PAYOFFS OF THE SENSOR (ROW PLAYER) AND THE OPERATOR (COLUMN PLAYER) AT EACH STAGE k
her utility by γ at the subsequent stage. Therefore, (T,NV )
dominates (T,V ). Similarly, by analyzing the payoff of the
sensor, we can see that (NT,NV ) dominates (T,NV ). We
have therefore discarded (T,V ) and (T,NV ) as pure Nash
equilibria of the stage games. Therefore, if a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium exists, the sensor will be playing NT .
However, given that the sensor is always playing NT , the
operator’s optimal choice is to set h = 0, and play NV .
Therefore, the only possible pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the game is (NT,NV ), in which the operator offers no
payment to the sensor. Note also that this is in fact the
operator’s outside option.
We, therefore, consider the mixed strategy equilibria of
the game. The following proposition characterizes the mixed
strategy NE of the game in Table I.
Proposition 2: Under the weighted reputation scheme in
(5), the mixed strategy equilibria of the game in Table I are
as follows. The operator verifies the sensor with probabilities
p2 =
h−R(x2)+
1
ω bx2
h+ γ
, p1 =
h−R(x1)+
1
1+(1−ω)δ
bx1
h+ γ
.
and the sensor reveals the truth with probabilities
q2 =
h− 1ωC
h+ γ
, q1 =
h− 1
1+(1−ω)δC
h+ γ
.
For these mixed strategies to exist, the operator should select
h,ω such that ωh>C.
Proof: See Appendix.
D. Optimal choice of payment parameters
We now determine the optimal choice of the parameters of
the payment scheme for the operator. Recall that the operator
wishes to choose h, γ , and ω to maximize E[UP], subject
to the (IC) and (IR) constraints of the sensor. We start by
optimizing the choice of h and γ given a fixed reputation
weight ω .
Theorem 1: Consider the linearly weighted reputation
function in (5). Assume that bx¯>
√
CS(x¯). Then, for a given
ω ,
(i) the optimal reputation parameters are γ = 0, and h= bx¯ω .
(ii) The operator will incentivize effort level x¯ at the first
stage, and the effort x∗ at the second stage, where
∂S
∂x (x
∗) = b for ω 6= 1.
(iii) The optimal actions are as follows. The operator ver-
ifies the sensor with probabilities p2 = 1 and p1 =
ω
1+(1−ω)δ . The sensor is truthful with probabilities q2 =
1− C
bx¯
and q1 = 1−
ω
1+(1−ω)δ
C
bx¯
.
Proof: See Appendix.
1) Role of inter-temporal incentives: Intuitively, the repu-
tation weight ω determines the importance of inter-temporal
incentives (i.e., conditioning future payments on the history
of past efforts). In particular, ω = 1 yields an instant payment
scheme, in which no inter-temporal incentives are present.
For this case, the actions of the operator and the sensor are
as follows.
Corollary 1: If ω = 1, the sensor realizes (x∗,x∗), the
operator verifies the sensor with probability p2 = p1 = 1,
and the sensor is only truthful with probability q1 = q2 =
1− C
bx¯
< 1.
Proof: Note that if ω = 1, we have h = bx¯ω =
bx¯
δ ω = bx¯
at each stage. This leads to the sensor chooses x∗ at both
first and second stage, i.e., x1 = x2 = x
∗ if ω = 1. Further,
substituting ω = 1 in (iii) of Theorem 1 leads to p2 = p1 = 1,
and q1 = q2 = 1−
C
bx¯
< 1.
For ω = 1, we can see that although the operator always
verifies the sensor, he chooses NT with a strictly positive
probability. It occurs due to the fact that for ω = 1, the utility
of the sensor under T is equal to his utility under NT . Hence,
the sensor is indifferent between choice of T and NT .
By comparing Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we observe that
while the verification frequency, falsification probabilities,
and the effort level of the senor, at the second stage with
the use of reputation remain equal to the case when no
reputation used, the values at the first stage are affected by
the introduction of inter-temporal incentives. In particular,
when the reputations that depend on history of the behavior
of the sensor are used, the operator needs to verify the sensor
with a lower probability, and the sensor is truthful with
a higher probability. Furthermore, the sensor exerts higher
effort in the first stage.
2) Optimal choice of the reputation weight ω: Finally, we
consider the optimal choice of ω , under which the operator’s
expected payoff is maximized.
Theorem 2: Assume that bx¯>
√
CS(x¯). A choice of ω =
1 maximizes the operator’s payoff. That is, instant pay-
ments yield higher payoffs than payments based on linearly
weighted reputations.
Proof: For bx¯ >
√
CS(x¯), the optimal choice of h is
identified in Theorem 1. Hence, we now analyze the optimal
choice of ω when h = bx¯ω and (x1,x2) = (x¯,x
∗). We need to
solve the following optimization problem:
max
ω
− (1+ δ )C+(1−
ω
δ ω
C
bx¯
)(S(x¯)− bx¯
δ ω
ω
)
+ δ (1−
C
bx¯
)(S(x∗)− bx∗) , s.t. 0≤ ω ≤ 1.
We take the derivative of the objective function with
respect to ω . Define f (ω) := δ
ω
ω . Then,
∂ E[UP]
∂ω
=−bx¯ f ′(ω)(1−
1
f 2(ω)
S(x¯)C
(bx¯)2
) .
With the assumption
√
CS(x¯)< bx¯, and noting that f (ω)≥ 1
and f ′(ω)< 0, we conclude that ∂ E[U
P ]
∂ω > 0. Thus, E[U
P] is
an increasing function of ω and the optimal choice is to set
ω = 1.
We observe that while using inter-temporal incentives
through linearly weighted reputation functions can benefit
the operator by reducing the required verification frequency,
increasing the effort level of the sensor, and increasing the
probability of truthfulness, it will nevertheless reduce the
operator’s overall payoff. This is because the operator has to
now offer a higher compensation to the sensor.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of contract design
between a system operator and a strategic sensor in a
repeated setting. The sensor is hired to exert costly effort
to collect sufficiently accurate observations for the operator.
As the effort invested and the accuracy of the resulting
outcome are both private information of the sensor, the op-
erator needs to design a compensation scheme that mitigates
moral hazard followed by adverse selection. We proposed
a reputation-based payment scheme coupled with stochastic
verification. We showed that by increasing the importance of
past behavior in our proposed linearly weighted reputation-
based payments, the sensor exerts higher effort, and has a
higher probability of being truthful. The operator, on the
other hand, can invoke verification less frequently, but offers
higher payments to the sensor, which leads to a lower payoff.
We have so far considered inter-temporal incentives that
are based on a linearly weighted reputation function. Con-
sidering other functional forms for evaluating a sensor’s rep-
utation, and its impact on the operator and sensor’s strategies
and payoffs, is an important direction of future work. In
addition, we have considered the design of individual con-
tracts for each sensor, due to our assumptions of independent
measurements and no budget constraint. As an interesting
direction of future work, we are interested in analyzing the
contract design problem for multiple sensors, given limited
budget of the operator, as well as when the outcomes of the
estimate at the sensor are coupled. Such coupling may enable
the operator to cross-verify the outcomes of the sensors.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2 : We use backward induction to find
the operator and sensor’s strategies, starting at time k = 2.
Assume the operator verifies the sensor with probability p2.
If the sensor reports truthfully, his expected utility is given
by
p2((1−ω)R1+ω(R(x2)+ γ)− bx2)+
(1− p2)((1−ω)R1+ωR(x2)− bx2) =
(1−ω)R1+ωR(x2)+ p2ωγ − bx2 .
If the sensor falsifies his report, his expected utility is given
by
p2((1−ω)R1)+ (1− p2)((1−ω)R1+ωh)
= (1−ω)R1+ω(1− p2)h .
To make the sensor indifferent between T and NT , the
verification probability should be
p2 =
h−R(x2)+
1
ω bx2
h+ γ
.
Now, assume the sensor is mixing between T and NT with
probability q2. To make the operator indifferent between V
and NV , we need
q2(S(x2)− ((1−ω)R1+ω(R(x2)+ γ))−C)+
(1− q2)(−(1−ω)R1−C) = q2(S(x2)−
((1−ω)R1+ωR(x2)))+ (1− q2)(−((1−ω)R1+ωh))
−q2ωγ −C =−(1− q2)ωh⇒ q2 =
h− 1ωC
h+ γ
.
Note that for the above mixed strategy to exist, the
operator should choose h and ω such that ωh>C. Otherwise,
the sensor will always play NT , leading to the operator
playing NV , i.e., the outside option.
Given the above mixed strategies, the expected utility of
the sensor with output x2 at the second stage is given by
E[US2 (R1,x2)] = q2((1−ω)R1+ωR(x2)+ p2ωγ − bx2)
+ (1− q2)((1−ω)R1+ω(1− p2)h)
= (1−ω)R1+
ωγh
h+ γ
+
h
h+ γ
(ωR(x2)− bx2) .
Finally, the expected payoff of the operator in the second
stage is given by
E[UP2 (R1,x2)] =−(1−ω)R1−ωh
γ + 1ωC
h+ γ
+
h− 1ωC
h+ γ
(S(x2)−ωR(x2))
We next consider the first stage. Let the probability of
verification by the operator be given by p1. If the sensor is
truthful in this stage, he gets utility
p1(R(x1)+ γ− bx1+ δU
S
2 (R(x1)+ γ,x2))
+ (1− p1)(R(x1)− bx1+ δU
S
2 (R(x1),x2))
= R(x1)− bx1+ δU
S
2 (R(x1),x2)+ p1γ(1+(1−ω)δ ) .
The payoff from falsification on the other hand is given
by
p1(δU
S
2 (0,x2))+ (1− p1)(h+ δU
S
2 (h,x2))
= h+ δUS2 (h,x2)− p1h(1+(1−ω)δ ) .
To make the sensor indifferent between the two actions,
p1 should be
p1 =
h−R(x1)+
1
1+(1−ω)δ bx1
h+ γ
.
Next, let q1 denote the probability that the sensor is
truthful in stage 1. To make the operator indifferent between
verification on not verifying, q1 should be given by
q1(S(x1)− (R1+ γ)+ δU
P
2 (R(x1)+ γ,x2)−C)+
(1− q1)(δU
P
2 (0,x2)−C) =
q1(S(x1)−R1+δU
P
2 (R(x1),x2))+(1−q1)(−h+δU
P
2 (h,x2))
This leads to
q1 =
h− 1
1+(1−ω)δ
C
h+ γ
.
We need to verify that the derived pk and qk are valid
probabilities. First, note that for q2 to be valid, we require
that ωh>C.3 Also, as 1+(1−ω)δ ≥ ω , the same assump-
tion ensures that q1 ≥ 0 as well. For the operator’s actions,
it is easy to see that 0≤ pk ≤ 1 holds.
Finally, note that the above analysis is valid when xk 6= 0.
If xk = 0 at either stage, the optimal strategy for the operator
in that stage is to play NV .
Proof of Theorem 1 : We now proceed to finding the
optimal choice of h and γ for the payment offered by the
operator, under a fixed choice of reputation weight ω .
We first find the expected payoff of the sensor over the
two stages of the game. The total utility of the sensor is
given by
E[US(x1,x2)] = R(x1)− bx1+
δ
(
(1−ω)R(x1)+
ωγh
h+ γ
+
h
h+ γ
(ωR(x2)− bx2)
)
+
h−R(x1)+
1
1+(1−ω)δ
bx1
h+ γ
γ(1+(1−ω)δ ) = (1+ δ )
γh
h+ γ
+
h
h+ γ
((1+(1−ω)δ )R(x1)+ωδR(x2)− bx1− δbx2) .
We also find the expected payoff of the operator.
E[UP(x1,x2)] =
(h− C
1+(1−ω)δ )(S(x1)+(1+(1−ω)δ )(h−R(x1 )))
h+ γ
−h+δ
(
−(1−ω)h−ωh
γ + 1ωC
h+ γ
+
h− 1ωC
h+ γ
(S(x2)−ωR(x2))
)
=−(1+δ )
γ +C
h+ γ
h+
h− 1
1+(1−ω)δ
C
h+ γ
(S(x1)−(1+(1−ω)δ )R(x1))
+δ
h− 1ωC
h+ γ
(S(x2)−ωR(x2)) .
First, note that with any reputation function, the derivative
of the operator’s utility with respect to γ is given by
∂ E[UP]
∂γ
=−
h− Cδ ω
(h+ γ)2
(S(x1)+ δ
ω(h−R(x1)))
− δ
h− Cω
(h+ γ)2
(S(x2)+ω(h−R(x2)))< 0 ,
3If ωh<C, the sensor will always play NT , in which case the operator
should play NV , leading to the operator’s outside option.
where δ ω := 1+(1−ω)δ . Note that ω ≤ δ ω , with equality
(only) at ω = 1. Therefore, the optimal choice is for the
operator to choose γ as small as possible (as long as the
sensor’s participation (IR) constraint is satisfied).
To proceed, we substitute R(x) = h x
x¯
. Assume the operator
wants to incentivize xˆ1, xˆ2. Consider the IC constraints of the
sensor. The first derivative of the sensor’s utility with respect
to his output level at each stage is given by
∂ E[US]
∂x1
=
h
h+ γ
(δ ω
h
x¯
−b) ,
∂ E[US]
∂x2
=
h
h+ γ
δ (ω
h
x¯
−b) .
Also, with linear reputation functions, the utility of the sensor
can be written as
E[US(x1,x2)] = (1+ δ )
γh
h+ γ
+
h
h+ γ
((
δ ωh
x¯
− b)x1+
δ (
ωh
x¯
− b)x2) .
Using the IC constraints, we conclude that the IR constraint
of the sensor is always satisfied. As a result, we also conclude
that the operator chooses γ = 0. Therefore, the utility of the
operator simplifies to
E[UP(x1,x2)] =−(1+ δ )C+(1−
1
δ ω
C
h
)(S(x1)−
δ ωh
x1
x¯
)+ δ (1−
1
ω
C
h
)(S(x2)−ωh
x2
x¯
) .
Using the IC constraints on the sensor’s utility, the opera-
tor can incentivize different efforts by the sensor, depending
on the choice of h:
• Case I: Set h< bx¯δ ω . Then, the sensor will realize output
0 in both stages. Note that by Proposition 2, the operator
will choose to not verify the sensor, leading to a utility
of zero. This is equivalent to the operator’s outside
option.
• Case II: Set h = bx¯/δ ω . In this case, the sensor will
realize output xˆ2 = 0 in the second stage, and be
indifferent between all xˆ1 in the first stage. Again by
the discussion in the proof of Proposition 2, the operator
will choose to not verify in the second stage. Therefore,
her utility in this case reduces to
E[UP(x1,0)] =−C+(1−
C
bx¯
)(S(xˆ1)− bxˆ1) .
Note that the operator will incentivize x1 = x
∗, for which
∂S
∂x (x
∗) = b.
• Case III: Set bx¯δ ω < h<
bx¯
ω . Then the sensor will realize
output 0 in the second stage, and output x¯ in the first
stage. Recall also that in order to have a valid mixed
strategy equilibrium, the operator has to pick h such that
ωh>C. The operator’s utility reduces to
E[UP(x¯,0)] =−C+(1−
1
δ ω
C
h
)(S(x¯)− δ ωh) .
The derivative of the operator’s utility with respect to h
is given by
∂ E[UP]
∂h
=
CS(x¯)− (hδ ω)2
h2δ ω
.
We see that if
√
CS(x¯)< bx¯, the utility of the operator
is decreasing in h. Therefore, the optimal chocie is to
set h = bx¯δ ω . Note that this case becomes equivalent to
Case II, but with the difference that the operator has
incentivized x¯. As x∗ is the optimal choice, it is easy
to see that Case II dominates Case III under these
parameters.
• Case IV: Set h = bx¯ω . In this case, the sensor will
realize output xˆ1 = x¯ in the first stage, and be indifferent
between all xˆ2 in the second stage.
E[UP(x¯,x2)] =−(1+ δ )C+
(1−
ω
δ ω
C
bx¯
)(S(x¯)−bx¯
δ ω
ω
)+δ (1−
C
bx¯
)(S(x2)−bx2) .
The operator will incentivize x2 = x
∗ for which ∂S∂x (x
∗)=
b.
• Case V: Set h> bx¯ω . Then, the sensor will realize output
x¯ in both stages. Note that with this choice, and the
assumption of bx¯>C, the constraint ωh>C is satisfied.
The operator’s utility reduces to:
E[UP(x¯, x¯)] =−(1+ δ )C+
(1−
1
δ ω
C
h
)(S(x¯)− δ ωh)+ δ (1−
1
ω
C
h
)(S(x¯)−ωh) .
The derivative of the operator’s utility with respect to h
is given by
∂ E[UP]
∂h
= (1+ δ )
[
CS(x¯[(1− δ )ω + δ ]
h2ωδ ω
− 1
]
, (6)
Note that since ω < δ ω , bx¯ < hω leads to bx¯ < hδ ω .
Thus, for
√
CS(x¯) < bx¯, we conclude that CS(x¯
h2ωδ ω
≤ 1.
Further given (1−δ )ω +δ ≤ 1, we can see that E[UP]
is a decreasing function of h and maximized if h= bx¯ω .
This reduces the problem to Case IV.
Comparing the payoff of the operator in the aforemen-
tioned five cases, we conclude that, given ω , the operator
chooses Case IV: h= bx¯ω .
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